Alarm analysis in electric power system based on expert system by Slaven Kaluđer et al.
S. Kaluđer et al.                                                                                                                        Analiza alarma u elektroenergetskom sustavu bazirana na ekspertnom sustavu 




ALARM ANALYSIS IN ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM BASED ON EXPERT SYSTEM 
 
Slaven Kaluđer, Saša Miletić, Srete Nikolovski 
 
Original scientific paper 
The occurrence of fault is an unwanted situation in electric power systems where certain network parts detach themselves from the remaining unaffected 
part of the network. The relay protection system has a task to isolate the faulty units or zone. When a certain protection level is being triggered alarms are 
sent to the transformer station and the dispatcher centre. These alarms reach the dispatcher centre in a short period of time which can lead the dispatcher to 
confusion and possible mistakes. To ease the dispatcher's position, an alarm processor is introduced. The alarm processor uses an expert system as its 
computer programme in the whole spectrum of variations. The analysed alarms are the ones being triggered while the TS 35/10 kV Istok is detaching from 
the rest of the electric power system. The objective of this project is to analyse alarms which have appeared in the dispatcher centre during the detachment 
of the TS 35/10 kV Istok, by using the expert system method. Final results have confirmed the section and cause of the TS 35/10 kV Istok detachment 
from the rest of the electric power system. 
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Analiza alarma u elektroenergetskom sustavu bazirana na ekspertnom sustavu 
 
Izvorni znanstveni članak 
Pojava kvara je neželjena situacija u elektroenergetskom sustavu prilikom koje se određeni dijelovi mreže odvajaju od ostatka mreže koja nije zahvaćena 
kvarom. Sustav relejne zaštite ima zadatak da izdvoji dionice koje se nalaze u kvaru. Pobuda određene zaštite šalje alarm u transformatorsku stanicu i 
dispečerski centar. Alarmi u dispečerski centar dolaze u kratkom vremenu što može dispečera zbuniti i navesti na pogrešku. Kako bi se olakšao posao 
dispečerima uvodi se procesor alarma. Procesor alarma kao računalni program koristi ekspertni sustav u cijelom nizu varijanti. Analizirani su alarmi koji 
se pojavljuju prilikom odvajanja TS 35/10 kV Istok od ostatka elektroenergetskog sustava. Cilj ovog rada je analiza alarma koji su se pojavili u 
dispečerskom centru prilikom ispada TS 35/10 kV Istok metodom ekspertnog sustava. Dobiveni rezultati su utvrdili dionicu i uzrok ispada TS 35/10 kV 
Istok od ostatka elektroenergetskog sustava. 
 






A fault in the electric power system (EPS) activates 
the relay protection system which isolates the faulted 
zone. The triggering of certain protection sends a signal to 
a local transformer substation (TS) and a long-range 
signal to the dispatch centre. In the dispatch centre, 
alarms are visible through the SCADA system which 
alongside a remote control, measurement and monitoring 
contains the chronological event list (CEL). The dispatch 
centre receives incoming alarms on CEL and stores them. 
Alarms consist of a wide group of signals which 
comprise: signalling the position of the circuit breaker 
(CB) and the disconnector, their assembling condition is 
described with, the activation and the tripping of certain 
protection. In addition to that they include failure of 
certain automatic switches inside the secondary 
development, failure of some devices in the same system, 
up to some minor alarms such as the signal which shows 
when TS doors are being opened. At the moment of the 
fault, alarms appear on the CEL screen and they are 
positioned above each other, so the alarm on the top 
points out the last situation in the network. It is easy to 
supervise all signals and network state as long as the 
number of alarms and situations is manageable. If some 
complex situation occurs, it causes an avalanche of a few 
hundreds alarms within a short period of time, further 
complicating the situation, and thus disabling the 
operator's reaction in due time or leading him towards 
doing a wrong action and consequently towards immense 
damage [13]. The network fault which cannot be 
eliminated by the protection due to additional equipment 
damage, will thus trigger the secondary protection to do 
the job, leaving black out areas under suspicion. During 
the fault, the operator has to process a huge amount of 
unprocessed data and carry out a complex decision 
making process within a short period of time. Alarm 
processors are used for these types of situations. The 
alarm processor uses the expert system (ES) as its 
computer programme. It is a computer programme which 
substitutes an experts thinking process within a narrow 
action field, to solve complex situations. The expert 
system consists of the knowledge base, algorithms and 
communication interface. The expert system treats EPS as 
a cluster made from network components: conductor 
wires, busbars, transformers, CBs and relays. During the 
TS 35/10 kV Istok detachment incoming alarms have 
been analysed in the dispatch centre using the expert 
system. The point of this analysis is the right application 
of this expert system method in the example of TS 35/10 




Expert system method  
 
Artificial intelligence is a scientific field dealing with 
implementing human thinking and natural phenomena. 
Expert systems (ES) are just one part of the whole 
artificial intelligence field. Expert systems are computer 
programmes which use expert knowledge to solve a 
complex problem within a narrow problem area [3]. There 
are many types of ES, and they are different from one 
another in a way they organize knowledge in their 
knowledge base. There are three types: Rule Base, Case 
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Base and Model Base [8]. ES can be off-line and on-line 
[11]. Here in the paper, ES that forms its knowledge on 
rule base [4] is analysed. The ES method uses hypothesis 
method – the same method as humans applied when 
analysing alarms, just in a modified, automatic version. 
The hypothesis method begins from the final Point 
(hypothesis) trying to include as many facts as possible, 
so that the hypothesis would stay active. The ES method 
is based on rules and principles which make hypotheses 
withholding predesigned fact clusters. The ES method is 
based on an algorithm which compares the rules. Fig. 1 
presents the ES method. 
 
 
Figure 1 The algorithm for the ES method 
 
Implementing the ES in EPS for the first time is 
encountered in the 1990s [6]. There are several fields 
where ES has been implemented: alarm analysis, fault 
diagnosis, load forecast, planning within the EPS, 
economic dispatch and production. The most widespread 
usage of ES is in analysing the alarm and diagnosing the 
failure, taking up 40 % of its usage, while the planning is 
used in 15 % of the cases [9]. ES method is shown in 
Figure 1: an incoming alarm, coming from rule-and-fact 
knowledge base, forms the hypothesis and checks if the 
alarm matches particular lists for certain hypothesis. If it 
does, then it increases the hypothesis for one, and if it 
does not, then new hypotheses are formed including their 
related alarm lists. After being increased by one, the 
hypotheses go to the assessment phase where each 
hypothesis is checked containing all the alarm signals. If 
the hypothesis has all the alarms, it gets printed out, if not, 
then it waits for the following alarm to do further 
assessment [1]. It should be noted that this is a genetic 
algorithm (GA) which has all the genetic features: random 
data entry, a certain type of selection and iteration leading 
to the possible solution. Diagnostic methods usually use 
backward reasoning. Relay function can also be viewed as 
forward reasoning, one thing causing the other. Forward 
reasoning starts from the known facts towards the goal. 
Alarm’s processor uses ES as the program to analyse 
appearing alarms during the fault in EPS. The alarm 
processor helps the operator to make decisions about the 
currently unknown black out areas after a breakdown of a 
certain part of EPS. The ES [2] method used in this paper, 
tries to organize huge amounts of disorganized data in the 
logical manner, extracting some diagnosis conclusions. It 
is important to emphasize that these are not standard 
numeric variables, but linguistic variables. Making logical 
relationships for these linguistic variables in a standard 
procedural language such as C++ requires enormous 
programming knowledge. Declarative programming is 
used for these kinds of problems. Here is a list of 
programs based on artificial intelligence: Lisp, PROLOG 
or OPS 83. The relationships between the regulations in 
the data base have six different types: cause-effect, 
mutual exclusivity, conflict, implication, redundancy and 
subsumption [12]. The cause-effect relationship and 
mutual exclusivity are the most commonly used. The only 
relationship, used in the paper for the rules model of ES, 
is cause-effect. Rules are formed in the IF-cause format; 
THEN-effect. The rules can be extended by using 
operators such as AND, OR, ELSE, ELSE if.  
The rules are formed in the lines such as:  
 
Rule A: IF cause  
                  THEN effect. 
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Rule B: IF Event  
                  THEN Expect. 
    . 
    . 
    . 
Rule n: IF x 
                 THEN y. 
 
There are no limits or strict regulations which could 
determine the number and methods of implementing the 
rules, but an expert himself/herself has to form a 
knowledge base in accordance with the field he is dealing 
with. A knowledge base can have both rules and facts. 
The ES method uses a hypothesis which people use when 
analysing alarms in their modified, automatic version. 
The hypothesis method starts from the end (hypothesis) 
trying to include as many facts as possible in order to 
remain active.  
Knowledge base consists of network topology and 
rules for fault diagnosis [5]. Network topology is 
presented by the facts and it is easily formed as network 
graph, whose nodes are easily interconnected. Rules for 
the fault location and fault diagnosis are obtained through 
interviews with people involved in relay protection. The 
rules are called cause-effect and can be defined for the 
components of the EPS to the parts of EPS. In these rules, 
the true knowledge of specific purpose is defined giving 
answer to the core of the problem.  
 
Network topology in the form of rules (facts) 
 
Network (bus-1, cb-1, line, on) 
Network (line, cb-2, bus-2, on) 
Network (bus-2, cb-3, trans-1, on) 
Network (bus-2, cb-4, trans-2, on) 
Network (trans-1, cb-5, bus-3, on) 
Network (trans-2, cb-6, bus-3, on) 




Network (<nod name>, <cb name>, < nod name>, on/off) 
[10]. 
 
Now we can present rules of operation. 
 
Rule 1: IF Failure feeder 10 kV <set name> 
THEN <protection trip> 
AND <circuit breaker 10 kV open> 
                           
Rule 2: IF Failure on transformer <set name> 
THEN <protection trip>  
AND <circuit breaker 10 kV open>  
AND <circuit breaker 35 kV open> 
 
Rule 3: IF Failure on feeder 35 kV <set name>  
THEN <protection trip>  
AND <circuit breaker 35 kV open> 
 
Rule 4: IF simultaneous failure at 35 kV and 10 kV 
feeder 
THEN <10 kV protection terminated>  
AND <35 kV protection trip>          
AND <circuit breaker 35 kV open> 
 
Rule 5: IF Non-selective operation of relay                      
THEN <10 kV protection terminated >  
AND <35 kV protection trip>          
AND <circuit breaker 35 kV open> 
 
The rules for the fault diagnosis [7] are based on the 
event tree and backward chaining or on the fault tree 
which is used to eliminate senseless and illogical 
conclusions.  
 
Rule A: IF <protection trip>  
AND <circuit breaker 10 kV open> 
THEN Failure feeder 10 kV <set name> 
 
Rule B: IF <protection trip>  
AND <circuit breaker 10 kV open>  
AND <circuit breaker 35 kV open>                  
THEN Failure on transformer <set name> 
 
Rule C: IF <protection trip > 
AND <circuit breaker 35 kV open> 
THEN Failure on feeder 35 kV <set name> 
 
Rule D: IF <10 kV protection terminated> 
AND <35 kV protection trip>          
AND <circuit breaker 35 kV open> 
THEN simultaneous failure at 35 kV and 10 kV 
feeder 
 
Rule E: IF <10 kV protection terminated> 
AND <35 kV protection trip>          
AND <circuit breaker 35 kV open> 
THEN Non-selective operation of relay  
 
Fault tree of rule A shown in Fig. 2. 
 
 
Figure 2 Fault tree of rule A 
 
3 
The results of the expert system method analysis 
 
Here, fault event described on February 10, 2010 
occurred during fault on 10 kV feeder KTS 108/208, 
where the entire TS 35/10 kV Istok was detached from the 
rest of the network. TS 35/10 kV Istok has two possible 
feeding directions: from TS 110/35 kV Osijek 1 and TS 
35/10 kV Šećerana. At the time of the fault TS 35/10 kV 
Istok was supplied from TS 110/35 kV Osijek 1. We 
modify method from [9] by putting increment score next 
to hypothesis. 
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Figure 4 Alarms from the plant 
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Relay protection settings of the part of the 
distribution 35 kV network Elektroslavonija are shown in 
Fig. 3. Fig. 4 shows the CEL at the TS 35/10 kV Istok in a 
moment of failure. The bottom of Fig. 3 shows the initial 
stage of the failure, while the final stage is shown on the 
top of Fig. 4, viewing from the bottom upwards. Since we 
are dealing here with electromechanical and static relays 
with no possibility of recording the current and voltage 
measurements at the point of failure, the only viable 
indicator of the situation is the CEL. Method of analysing 
the CEL relies on the state of the switch (open/close) and 
the state of the relay (start/trip). Fault diagnosis can be 
further developed if the relay has the ability to record 
current and voltage. Therefore, ES can also be 
programmed to use the state of the switch and relay 
alongside measuring current and voltage, and thus 
fulfilling the diagnosis. The presented ES construction 
will be solely based on the switch and relay states.  
 
Step 1 – Hypotheses are not formed due to no existing 
alarm  
 
Step 2 – Message (Alarm – 10 kV short-circuit protection 
trip) finds corresponding hypothesis from the rules and 
increases it by one.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Failure at 10 kV feeder <setname> +1 
                           
                       Switch 10 kV open 
                       short-circuit protection trip 
 
Step 3 – Estimation phase, not a single hypothesis reaches 
full score.                           
 
Step 4 – Message (Alarm – 10 kV 108/208 circuit breaker 
open) finds the corresponding hypotheses and increases 
them by one.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Failure at 10 kV feeder <108/208> +2 
                           
                       circuit breaker 10 kV off 
                       short-circuit protection  trip  Full score 
 
Step 5 – Estimation phase, hypothesis 1 reaches full score 
and prints it out.                           
 
Step 6 – Message (Alarm – 10 kV short-circuit protection 
terminated) generates itself by hypothesis 1 and 
hypothesis 2 
 
Hypothesis 1: Non-selective operation of relay 35 kV +1         
                                
                       circuit breaker 35 kV open 
                       Short-circuit protection trip 35 kV 
                       10 kV short-circuit protection terminated 
                                 
Hypothesis 2: Simultaneous failure at 35 kV and 10 kV 
VP +1 
  
                         circuit breaker 35 kV open 
                         Short-circuit protection trip 35 kV 
                        10 kV Short-circuit protection terminated 
 
Step 7 – Estimation phase, hypotheses 1 and 2 have not 
reached full score. 
 
Step 8 – Message (Alarm – OS 1 35 kV short-circuit 
protection trip) increases hypotheses 1 and 2 by one, but 
hypothesis 3 is also being increased by one.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Non-selective operation of relay 35 kV +2 
                                
                        circuit breaker 35 kV open 
                        Short-circuit protection trip 35 kV 
                        10 kV Short-circuit protection terminated 
 
Hypothesis 2: Simultaneous failure at both 35 kV and 10 
kV feeder + 2  
                                
                        circuit breaker 35 kV open 
                        Short-circuit protection trip 35 kV 
                        10 kV Short-circuit protection terminated 
 
Hypothesis 3: Failure on 35 kV feeder <OS1> +1 
                              
                       circuit breaker 35 kV open 
                       Short-circuit protection trip 35 kV 
 
Step 9 – Estimation phase, not a single hypothesis has 
reached full score. 
 
Step 10 – Message (Alarm – OS1 35 kV Istok circuit 
breaker open) increases all three hypotheses by one. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Non-selective operation of relay 35 kV +3 
                                
                       circuit breaker 35 kV open 
                       Short-circuit protection trip 35 kV 
                       10 kV Short-circuit protection terminated 
                                 
Hypothesis 2: Simultaneous failure at 35 kV and 10 kV 
feeder +3 
                                
                        circuit breaker 35 kV open 
                        Short-circuit protection trip 35 kV 
                       10 kV Short-circuit protection terminated 
 
Hypothesis 3: Failure at 35 kV feeder <OS1> +2               
                              
                        circuit breaker 35 kV open 
                        Short-circuit protection trip 35 kV 
 
Step 11 – Estimation phase, all three hypotheses reach full 
score and results are printed. There is no longer any active 
hypothesis.  
 
Description of the manipulation situation within the 
network will not be included in this analysis for the sake 
of simplicity. At the moment 20:50:21,191 the operator 
turns off CB of transmission line towards TS 110/35/10 
kV OS1, followed by a disconnector. Afterwards at 
20:50:54.248 operator turns off 10 kV CB of transformer 
2, followed by 35 kV CB of transformer 2. The operator 
at 20:51:32.616 turns off 10 kV CB of transformer 1, 
followed by 35 kV CB of transformer 1. For unloading 10 
kV buses, he switches off feeder 10 kV Tufek at the 
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moment 20:52:11,265. After that (at the moment 
20:52:24,778) he turns on 35 kV CB feeder Šećerana and 
powers the station from the other side. After these 
operations he illogically switches off feeder 10 kV KTS 
180 at 20:52:43,043 which he was supposed to do after 
unloading the feeder 10 kV Tufek. At the moment 
20:53:15,660 he turns on 35 kV CB of transformer 1, and 
a bit later 35 kV CB of transformer 2. After that at 
20:53:32,875 he illogically turns off feeder 10 kV KTS 
265 to unload 10 kV buses which he should have done 
while disconnecting feeder 10 kV Tufek. At the moment 
20:53:56,047 the 10 kV CB of transformer 1 is turned on 
to feed bus 10 kV by electricity, and at 20:54:23,789 10 
kV CB of transformer 2 is turned on thus putting 
transformers in parallel work. After that 10 kV buses are 
loaded when at 20:54:45,668 10 kV CB of feeder KTS 
265 is turned on, and shortly afterwards feeders 10 kV 
KTS 180 and feeder 10 kV Tufek. The operator then turns 
on at 21:14:42.755 35 kV CB of transmission line OS1-
Istok, and at 21:42:19.626 he turns on the disconnector, 
followed by the CB, leading transmission line into 
parallel with 35 kV transmission line Šećerana. After that 
at 21:25:42.409 the operator turns off 35 kV transmission 
Šećerana, loading buses 10 kV, and at 21:26:15.426 he 
turns on feeder 10 kV 108/208. 
 
Step 12 – Hypotheses are not formed due to any alarm.  
 
Step 13 – Message (Alarm – 10 kv short-circuit protection 
off) finds corresponding hypothesis from the rules and 
increases it by one 
 
Hypothesis 1: Failure at 10 kV feeder <setname> +1 
                           
                       circuit breaker 10 kV open 
                       Short-circuit protection trip 
 
Step 14 – Estimation phase, not a single hypothesis has 
reached full score.                           
 
Step 15 – Message (Alarm – 10 kV 108/208 circuit 
breaker open) finds corresponding hypotheses and 
increases them by one.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Failure at 10 kV feeder <108/208> +2      
                           
                        circuit breaker 10 kV open 
                        Short-circuit protection trip  Full score 
 
Step 16 – Estimation phase, hypothesis 1 reaches and it is 
printed out with its corresponding alarms.  
 
Step 17 – Message (Alarm – 10 kV short-circuit 
protection terminated) generates hypotheses 1 and 2 and 
increases them by one.    
 
Hypothesis 1: Non-selective operation of relay 35 kV +1 
                                
                       circuit breaker 35 kV open 
                       Short-circuit protection trip 35 kV 
                       10 kV Short circuit protection terminated 
                                 
Hypothesis 2: Simultaneous failure at 10 kV and 35 kV 
feeder +1 
                                
                         circuit breaker 35 kV open 
                         Short-circuit protection trip 35 kV 
                         10 kV Short-circuit protection terminated 
 
Step 18 – Estimation phase of hypotheses 1 and 2 have 
not reached full score. 
 
Step 19 – Message (Alarm – OS 1 35 kV Short-circuit 
protection trip) increases hypotheses 1 and 2 by one, but 
hypothesis 3 is also generated and increased by one. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Non-selective operation of relay 35 kV +2 
                                
                       circuit breaker 35 kV open 
                       Short-circuit protection trip 35 kV 
                       10 kV short-circuit protection terminated 
  
Hypothesis 2: Simultaneous failure at 35 kV and 10 kV 
feeder +2 
                                
                        circuit breaker 35 kV open 
                        Short-circuit protection trip 35 kV 
                        10 kV Short-circuit protection terminated 
                            
Hypothesis 3: Failure at 35 kV feeder <OS1> +1 
                              
                       circuit breaker 35 kV open 
                       Short-circuit protection trip 35 kV 
 
Step 20 – Estimation phase, not a single hypothesis has 
reached full score. 
 
Step 21 – Message (Alarm – OS1 35 kV Istok circuit 
breaker open) increased both hypotheses by one. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Non-selective operation of relay 35 kV +3 
                                
                       circuit breaker 35 kV open 
                       Short-circuit protection trip 35 kV 
                       10 kV Short-circuit protection terminated 
 
Hypothesis 2: Simultaneous failure at 35 kV and 10 kV 
feeder +3 
                                
                        circuit breaker 35 kV open 
                        Short-circuit protection trip 35 kV 
                        10 kV Short-circuit protection terminated 
 
Hypothesis 3: Failure at 35 kV feeder <OS1> +2 
                              
                       circuit breaker  35 kV open 
                       Short-circuit protection trip 35 kV 
 
Step 22 – Estimation phase of all three hypotheses 
reaches full score and results are printed out. There are no 
more active hypotheses.  
If results obtained in steps 1 to 11 and steps 12 to 22 
are compared it can be seen that they are the same 
because alarms appear twice based on Fig. 4. First time 
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alarms are provoked by the fault and second time alarms 





Alarm analysis is designed by using the expert system 
method making logically organized structure of failure 
diagnoses from basics data. The expert system method 
used in the alarm analysis clearly shows that there was a 
failure at 10 kV feeder and non-selective operation of 
relay at 35 kV which protects the transmission line 
between the two substations. The emergence of the 
diagnosis (hypothesis) of the failure at 35 kV feeder is an 
aftermath of the non-selective operation of relay which 
unnecessarily detached 35 kV feeder. The diagnosis of the 
simultaneous failure at 35 kV and 10 kV feeder was also 
rejected, but it will appear on the screen as a fault 
possibility.  This conclusion comes from CEL during the 
network’s transformation to its original state. A dynamic 
input data are given in the form of linguistic variables, 
therefore the solution is also a dynamic cluster of 
linguistic variables (hypotheses). The solution is changed 
in accordance with the incoming data. Incoming data 
stochastically arrive according to a generic algorithm 
which places hypotheses and comparisons in a certain 
criterion. A number of iterations in the generic algorithm 
are finite and determined by the number of input alarms.  
Further scientific research of the alarm analysis could 
apply expert systems with uncertainty, expert systems 
based on unclear logic, fuzzy logic or some other artificial 
intelligence method. The analysis can be further 
expanded, if we take measurements of current and voltage 
into consideration alongside the switch and relay states, at 
the point of failure and based on common data, thus 
getting a more complete review of the event. Based on all 
available data from SCADA, alarm analysis using ES 
provides a more complete review of the failure events in 
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